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Abstract
Scientific realists offer different accounts of when it is rationally warranted to be-
lieve in the existence of entities postulated in science. Some argue that in order to
avoid speculative metaphysics, the epistemic line must be drawn at the point of causal
interaction, yielding beliefs about the entities we are causally connected with in a par-
ticular way. Others claim that explanatory power is enough to warrant belief, and that
we ought to accept the existence of whatever entities that best explains our observa-
tions. The distinction between explanationists and what we may call ’detectionists’
can be illuminated by considering the evidence and reasoning permeating many cases
in astronomy and cosmology. In this paper, I present two such cases that disfavour
the detectionist account of normative belief and favor the explanationist. Cosmology
and astronomy provide a rich scientific context in which we can test the plausibility of
accounts for rational belief given by philosophers of science. I argue that the account of
rational belief given by detectionism is made implausible when applied in this context.
1 Introduction
Philosophers of science disagree about where to draw the line regarding which theories one
ought to believe are true, and/or which entities one ought to believe exist. In the scientific
realist camp, Psillos defends the idea that inference to the best explanation ”is the kind of
inference which authorises the acceptance of a hypothesis H as true, on the basis that it is the
best explanation of the evidence.” (Psillos 2009, 68) In Psillos’ general account of realism,
the so called ‘Divide et impera’ approach, he restricts the legitimacy of truth-inferences to
entities associated with predictive empirical success. This means that if part of a theory is
indispensable for the predictive success of the theory, we may infer the (approximate) truth
of that part, precisely because the best explanation for its predictive success is its truth.
This condition for belief is by and large shared by Kitcher (2001):
Instead of thinking about the virtues and vices of whole theories, we should
distinguish the hypotheses that are genuinely put to work, claiming that the
success of a theory provides grounds for thinking that those hypotheses - the
hypotheses that characterize “working posits” - are approximately true. (Kitcher
2001, 170)
Because of the epistemic emphasis given to the explanatory connection between success
and truth, the position held by Psillos and Kitcher is sometimes referred to as explanation-
ism. Realists with more modest ambitions have worried about the possible metaphysical
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inflation that the explanationist approach might bring to scientific beliefs and have instead
adopted a more conservative strategy for belief. Two realist views that arguably aims for
a more conservative approach is the ‘semi-realism’ offered by Chakravartty (2007), and the
‘theoretical irrealism’ forwarded by Azzouni (2004). Both philosophers have an essentially
realist view, but take precautionary steps with respect to the epistemology of scientific re-
alism. The epistemology championed in these views centers around causal contact, where
belief in the existence of an object of scientific study is premised on the causal interaction
with that object. Chakravartty makes an epistemic distinction between what he calls aux-
iliary properties, defined as the properties which a theory ascribes to a theoretical entity,
and detection properties defined as ”the causal properties one knows, or in other words, the
properties in whose existence one most reasonably believes on the basis of our causal con-
tact with the world.” (Chakravartty 2007, 47) He assigns a demarcation criterion in order
to distinguish between auxiliary properties and detection properties based on instrumen-
tal interaction to the world via causal processes. Azzouni (2004) employs a similar line of
reasoning, but argues at more length that extending entity-realism beyond observables is
justified because instrumental interactions share the relevant epistemic properties of obser-
vation. In virtue of the epistemic emphasis given to the causal detection of objects I will
refer to the position held by Chakravartty and Azzouni as detectionism.
In this paper, I argue against detectionism. I present two arguments based on the evi-
dence and reasoning found in astronomy and cosmology which show that it is reasonable to
believe in the existence of some objects despite lacking the causal contact that detectionism
premises belief on. The paper is disposed as follows. I start by making a some prelimi-
nary remarks with respect to the approach of letting scientific results inform philosophical
doctrines. Section 3 explicates the view I call detectionism, and its particular formulation
given by Azzouni. The first argument against this view is given in section 4 and focus on
the cosmic event horizon and the epistemic status of objects crossing it. Since the cosmic
event horizon marks a causal boundary, detectionism implies that we should instantaneously
stop believing in the existence of an object at the time the objects crosses the horizon. I
argue that there is good reason to reject such an epistemology. The detectionist account
also struggles to make sense with respect to objects the light of which has not yet reached
us. The second argument against detectionism focus on the nature of the evidence and
reasoning for the existence of dark matter given by cosmologists and astronomers. I outline
some of the most well-known and salient evidence used to support the existence of dark
matter and show that none of the evidence is compatible with the detectionist condition for
belief. This argument constitutes section 5. In section 6 I argue that an explanationist is
much less troubled by these results in cosmology. Section 7 concludes.
2 Scientifically informed realism
I want to make some preliminary remarks that I hope can help serve to dissipate any
skepticism about the idea that scientific results can, or even should, inform philosophical
doctrines about those very results.
Since the aim of the paper is to argue that one particular version of scientific realist
epistemology surpasses another, one could worry about exactly how specific scientific re-
sults can bring to bear on such an aim. Realism, after all, is supposed to guide rational
commitment with respect to those results, not the other way around. Any criticism against
a philosophical view would be expected to origin from philosophical argument - perhaps a
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logical inconsistency or a reductio - as opposed to the scientific results which are the very
object of study for those philosophical views. Following Azhar and Butterfield (2017), I
argue that case-studies of particular scientific results (and reasoning) can have rich philo-
sophical implications. Throughout the history of science the implication of theoretical and
experimental results have greatly outstripped philosophical imagination, providing pressure
on philosophers to reevaluate epistemic claims about the nature of evidence, its relation
to specific hypotheses, our epistemic access to the world and so forth.1 Cosmology is a
scientific study that lends itself well to provide precisely this sort of pressure. In cosmology,
we find extraordinary claims of knowledge about fundamental questions such as the origin
and evolution of the universe or the nature of space and time (or spacetime). Surely, such
claims should prompt us to consider how cosmologists can know about such matters. As
an example of how cosmology can impact philosophical views, Azhar and Butterfield (2017)
argue that:
[C]osmology threatens the usual philosophical distinction between (i) under-
determination by all data one could in principle obtain, and (ii) under-determination
by all data obtainable in practice, or up to a certain stage of enquiry. [...] For
data about the early universe is so hard to get that what is not obtainable in
practice looks very much unobtainable in principle! (Azhar and Butterfield 2017,
10)
In this spirit, I see it as both a reasonable and interesting endeavor to investigate which
scientific claims that latch on to realist epistemologies, and assess possible divergences be-
tween what cosmologists claim to know, and what realists claim that one ought to believe.
3 Detectionism and instrumental interactions
As we saw, Chakravartty’s semi-realism distinguishes between auxiliary and detection prop-
erties, where only the latter are candidates for belief. He relies on causality to provide the
epistemic connection between them and us:
The realist requires a practical means of demarcating detection properties (and
the structures associated with them) from auxiliary properties. Here is a sugges-
tion. Detection properties are connected via causal processes to our instruments
and other means of detection. (Chakravartty 2007, 48)
This modest approach towards a realist epistemology is also present in Azzouni’s account,
which involves believing in objects which we have what Azzouni calls ‘thick epistemic access’
to. Thick epistemic access is argued to be a sufficient condition for belief in theoretical
entities. This is contrasted by the notion of ‘thin epistemic access’, a kind of Quinean
confirmational holism where the existence of stipulated objects in a theory are confirmed
when the theory as a whole is confirmed. Thick epistemic access is defined such that ”[t]he
epistemic processes, which establishes truths that we’re committed to, must be sensitive
to the objects about which we’re establishing those truths” (Azzouni 2004, 372). Thick
1Standout examples include how the emergence of quantum mechanics impacted Leibniz Principle of
the identity of indiscernibles (see French and Redhead (1988) and Butterfield (1993)), as well as how the
limits of empirical enquiry in high energy physics can lead to reassessing the epistemic role of non-empirical
theory assessment (see Dawid et al. (2015), Dawid (2016, 2017)), or how experimental practices can shape
epistemology with respect to science (see Evans and Thebault (2019)).
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epistemic processes then have to satisfy a sensitivity condition, a condition Azzouni calls
the ‘tracking requirement’. The process essentially has to track the relevant objects over
time. While he takes observation to be the most obvious epistemic process that satisfies
the tracking requirement, he argues that instrumental interactions does as well. Since the
salient epistemic traits of instrumental interactions are the same as the epistemic traits that
observation have, they are thereby able to license belief about objects accessible through
such interactions. In other words, instrumental interactions can be thick epistemic processes
which satisfy the tracking requirement. Azzouni claims that the relevant relation by which
we establish knowledge via instrumental interactions is causation, by virtue of it being the
most reasonable process by which we establish relations of sensitivity:
[...] for macro-objects like ourselves, the only respectable tool to satisfy the
tracking requirement is the cognitive grasping of properties of objects by causa-
tion of some sort - sensitivity to objects must be due to a physical operation of
those objects (or of things which those objects have affected) on us. (Azzouni
2004, 374)
The normative verdict on whether or not we ought to believe in the existence of theo-
retical entities will thus depend on the nature of the epistemic process through which the
evidence is gained with respect to the offered normative conditions. But which epistemic
features does Azzouni claim that observation and instrumental interaction share? For any
process to be epistemically privileged it must be the case that it:
(1) reveals properties that upset our (theoretical) expectations; further, what
instruments detect greatly outstrips what theories predict about this; (2) involves
autonomous - theory-free - means of adjusting and refining instruments and what
they reveal; (3) allows monitoring over time, and (4) allows a study of how the
instrumental assess to items reveals properties of what’s being studied. (Azzouni
2004, 383-4)
Since these features are not sui generis for observation, whatever epistemic process that
shares these salient features will be equally epistemically privileged. One such process,
Azzouni argues, is instrumental interactions in science, so if we ought to believe in the
things we observe because observation has a set of particular epistemic features, then we
ought to believe in the objects that instrumental interaction detect for the very same reasons:
For instrumental interactions with theoretical objects [...] have the same four
aspects that observation has. We can take the theoretical entities (which we
have epistemic access to) to be real for the same reasons and on exactly the
same grounds as we can take observational entities to be real. (Azzouni 2004,
383-4)
At this point, I want to disperse two possible worries about Azzouni’s use of causality.
One could worry about the fact that Azzouni’s account focus on causal interactions with
theoretical objects. Sometimes, theoretical is taken to mean non-empirical, in which case
causal interaction with such objects would be impossible. However, we may simply interpret
Azzouni charitably and say that an object is theoretical in so far as its nature and description
is given by the theoretical framework in which it is embedded. Such an interpretation does
not exclude possible causal interactions with theoretical objects, but it does not guarantee
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it either. Azzouni is also unclear with respect to the kind of causal interactions that we may
use in order to gauge which objects we can believe are real. Should we take interactions
to mean processes which involve manipulability, or perhaps intervention? Since Azzouni’s
account is meant to defend a restricted form of entity realism (and therefore theoretical
irrealism), one might be tempted to think about these interactions as Hacking (1983) does,
which has famously become the slogan of entity realism: ”[s]o far as I’m concerned, if you
can spray them then they are real. [23]” While this approach seems perfectly defensible with
respect to instrumental interactions with (certain) microphysical objects, it’s obviously not
a feasible method for instrumental interactions with large scale systems such as galaxies,
nebulae, quasars, black holes and the cosmic microwave background. There is no spraying of
these objects. Clearly, it is not reasonable to use this account in order to flesh out Azzouni’s
causal condition. What about an interventionist account? Alas, this view on causality would
struggle to establish causal relations between observers and large scale systems. We simply
cannot intervene with large scale systems millions of miles away. One way to circumvent
such issues is to employ counterfactuals with respect to the possibility of interventions:
[W]hat is crucial is not whether the antecedent of the relevant counterfactual is
nomologically or physically possible but rather whether we are in possession of
well-grounded scientific theories and accompanying mathematics that allow us
to reliably answer questions about what would happen under the supposition
of such antecedents. We count interventions as “possible” as long as this is the
case. (Woodward (2016))
If we are to invoke theory in order to establish the truth of such counterfactuals, this
move is clearly theory-dependent, and as such not suitable for establishing the kind of
account of instrumental interactions that is needed in this context. We cannot refer to
theory to establish what should be taken to be instrumental interactions if the instrumental
interactions are what we are supposed to be using in order to circumvent theory-dependence
in determining in what entities we ought to believe.2 While it’s unclear which account of
causality that best suits Azzouni, we may put this issue aside and simply understand his
view of causal interaction in a more commonsense fashion. Instrumental interactions can
be understood in terms of a causal chain that leads from the measured scientific object to
the measuring device. So long as there is a causal chain between object and instrument,
information about that object is possible and we can take such objects to be real. Now
that we have made the detectionist position clear, the next two sections will show that
detectionism fails to provide a satisfying epistemology when applied to cases in astronomy
and cosmology.
4 Horizons and the Hubble sphere
One way in which the detectionist model fail is when applied to objects in space that we can
know about, but from which we nevertheless cannot gain causal information. Much of the
2Another aspect in which instrumental interactions might be theory-dependent has been suggested by
Psillos (2009, 87): ”What are really observed in relatively sophisticated scientific contexts (e.g., in the
context of an experiment) are not the phenomena themselves but data. [...] Strictly speaking, observations
are of data.” In the context of observational astronomy, the data might consist of lines in the spectrum
of electromagnetic radiation obtained by, for example, the Hubble telescope, which are then sorted and
converted into data-sets based on models. The data-sets can then be used to construct the fantastic images
of galaxies and nebulae that the Hubble telescope is known for.
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background in the following argument is based on work by Davis and Lineweaver (2004).
In cosmology there are a number of different ‘horizons’ - descriptions of boundaries in
spacetime fixed by certain variables - associated with the expansion of the universe.3 Ever
since Friedmann and Lamaˆıtre’s solutions of Einstein’s field equations implied a dynamical
universe, which was subsequently confirmed by observations by Hubble and Slipher, we have
known that the universe is expanding. As a consequence of this expansion the frequency
of light emitted from distant objects, which takes a long time to reach observers, will have
changed due to the fact that space itself has expanded during that time. This change of
frequency due to the expansion of space is known as cosmological redshift since the light
emitted from receding objects have shifted to red. The observational measure of redshift is





In the standard model of cosmology, the ΛCDM model, any object where z > 1.46 has a
receding velocity greater than the speed of light. Receding velocity is commonly not thought
of as proper velocity since the value of z is not given by objects strictly speaking moving
away from each other, but from the fact that space is expanding in between objects.4 A
horizon, then, is a measure of distance based on the speed of light and a time-interval.
The particle horizon is defined by the maximal distance that a photon can have travelled
between t = 0 and any given time (t). The event horizon is the maximal distance that a
photon can travel between a given time (t) and t =∞. Given that there are objects with a
redshift, z, greater than the speed of light, this should imply that light emitted from such
objects can never reach us, and therefore, by detectionists lights, we ought not to believe in
the existence of such objects. This, however, is not necessarily so.
We can take the total velocity of light (vtot) to be the velocity of recession (vrec) plus
its local peculiar value (c). If vrec > c, this should imply that the total velocity of light
is negative, i.e ”moving” away from us. We can, however, use Hubble’s law (vrec = HD)






In models where DHS increases with time, light can still reach us so long as the recession
velocity of the Hubble sphere is greater than the value of the total velocity of the light.
Light emitted by objects receding faster than c can therefore reach observers when DHS has
expanded enough to include that light in its subluminally expanding domain:
In decelerating universes H decreases as a˙ decreases (causing the Hubble sphere
to recede). In accelerating universes H also tends to decrease since a˙ increases
more slowly than a. As long as the Hubble sphere recedes faster than the photons
immediately outside it, D˙H > vrec − c, the photons end up in a subluminal
region and approach us. Thus photons near the Hubble sphere that are receding
slowly are overtaken by the more rapidly receding Hubble sphere. (Davis and
Lineweaver 2004, 105)
3Even though event horizons may primarily be associated with black holes, which is another example of
a causal boundary, they are not sui generis for black holes.
4Since the relative ”motion” of objects with z > 1.46 is not in any observers inertial frame, the fact that
some galaxies have recession velocities greater than the speed of light does not violate special relativity.
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Figure 1: Spacetime diagram of the expansion of the universe based on the cosmic standard
model ΛCDM (ΩM = 0.3,ΩΛ = 0.7, and H0 = 70km/s
−1Mpc−1) and General Relativity.
Centered vertical thick dotted line shows our worldline, paralell thin dotted lines show
worldlines of comoving objects. Comoving objects outside of the Hubble sphere has vrec > c.
Currently (t=now) observable events are inside the light cone, ∼ 46 Gyr away, which is also
the current distance to the particle horizon. Diagram reconstructed based on Davis and
Lineweaver (2004).
This allows us to make two interesting points against the detectionist. The first is that
there must be objects which have emitted light that has not reached us yet, given that the
light is currently in a region of space receding superluminally (that is, at a velocity > c),
but that eventually will reach us. The second is that, since the distance to the objects
emitting that light increases, so does their recession velocity, meaning that light emitted
from them today will never reach us. What does this imply for detectionism? Regarding
the first point, should we already believe that there are such objects, or should our belief in
them be suspended until its light reaches us? Since the light is the first ever causal contact
we have with the object, the natural interpretation from a detectionist point of view is the
latter. The latter option, however, is incompatible with the second point. At the time when
information, in the form of light, about a receding object reaches us, detectionism says that
we in fact should not believe that the object that emitted the light exists, since at this point,
that object has crossed the event horizon. If it has crossed the horizon this means that we
can never come in causal contact with it, which ultimately, according to the detectionist
view, implies that we should suspend our belief in its existence. On this view, such objects
are not really objects, but merely images of non-existing objects. In a sense, such objects
are ghosts. And we shouldn’t believe in ghosts. Perhaps detectionists would argue that
what we should believe is that such objects have existed in the past, that is, at the time
they emitted their light - there is no need to speculate about whether those objects still
exist today. This has a rather peculiar implication for galaxies that cross the event horizon:
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Most observationally viable cosmological models have event horizons and in the
ΛCDM model, galaxies with redshift z ∼ 1.8 are currently crossing our event
horizon. These are the most distant objects from which we will ever be able to
receive information about the present day. The particle horizon marks the size of
our observable universe. It is the distance to the most distant object we can see
at any particular time. The particle horizon can be larger than the event horizon
because, although we cannot see events that occur beyond our event horizon, we
can still see many galaxies that are beyond our current event horizon by light
they emitted long ago. (Davis and Lineweaver 2004, 101)
This means that everyday, we ought to reduce the number of galaxies we believe exists,
since, for every passing day, the number of galaxies which we can receive information from
decreases.5 There is no reason to expect these galaxies to suddenly collapse or vanish
simply because we cannot longer receive information from them, but it is nevertheless what
detectionism implies. It continuously and instantaneously revise the epistemic status of
galaxies crossing the event horizon by shifting belief in them from existing to non-existing
(or have existed). Surely, this is not a reasonable epistemic stance towards such objects.
5 Dark matter
The case of dark matter can provide an additional context of evaluation with respect to
detectionist epistemology. Looking at the evidence given for the existence of dark matter
should provide us with clear answers from detectionists regarding whether or not we ought
to belief in its existence. A complete review of the evidence given to support the existence
of dark matter lies beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief overview of the evidence
usually invoked for its existence suffices to bring out the nature of the evidence, enabling a
normative assessment. I will largely follow the canonical description of the history of dark
matter as given by Bertone and Hooper (2018).
5.1 Galaxy rotation curves
Even though Zwicky’s measurements of the coma cluster already in the 1930’s revealed
a high mass-to-light discrepancy which he explained by postulating ‘dunkle materie’, the
discrepancy, and its explanation, was only taken seriously after Rubin’s measurements of the
Andromeda galaxy. In the 1970’s, Rubin and Ford Jr (1970) used an image tube spectograph
built by Ford in order to make observations of the Andromeda galaxy. Previous observations
had been made using radio telescopes, but the improved accuracy of Ford’s spectograph
enabled a qualitatively increased measurement of the galaxy’s rotation curve. The rotation
curve of a galaxy is roughly the plotted orbital speed of stars and gas as a function of
their distance from the galactic center. In smaller systems, such as our solar system, the
orbital speed decreases with distance so that planets close to the sun orbits faster than
planets further away. When analyzing the rotation curve of Andromeda however, Rubin
and Ford obtained a ’flat’ rotation curve, meaning that the orbital speed of the stars and
gas in it did not decline with increasing distance from the galaxy center. A consequence
of flat rotation curves is that with the speed measured, the gravity from the luminous
5In dark energy dominated models, given enough time, we should not believe that there is anything
beyond the milky way. This is because space keeps expanding between, but not within, all gravitationally
bound objects.
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mass in galaxies is not enough to keep it together. Much work on the rotation curves
of galaxies followed, and Bosma (1978) published the results, and accompanying rotation
curves, from radio observations of 25 galaxies, most of which displayed flatness out to
the largest observed radius, showing that the mass-to-light discrepancies in galaxies were
systematic. Faber and Gallagher (1979) reviewed the status of mass-to-light discrepancies in
galaxies, in the abstract saying that ”After reviewing all the evidence, it is our opinion that
the case for invisible mass in the universe is very strong and becoming stronger”. Bertone
and Hooper (2018) writes that ”a consensus [...] began to to emerge in favor of dark matter’s
existence”[57].
5.2 Gravitational lensing
Gravitational lensing is the physical phenomena produced by:
[...] the deflection of photons as they pass through the warped space-time of
a gravitational field. Light rays from distant sources are not “straight” (in a
Euclidean frame) if they pass near massive objects, such as stars, clusters of
galaxies or dark matter, along our line of sight. (Massey et al. 2010, 3)
As the quote indicates, one kind of evidence for dark matter comes from measuring the
effects of gravitational lensing by galaxies and galaxy clusters. Clowe et al. (2006) used
weak gravitational lensing observations of the Bullet cluster as evidence of the presence
of dark matter. The Bullet cluster consists of a pair of colliding galaxy clusters, and as
a result of the collision, the matter distribution in the region had been altered, spatially
separating the hot X-ray emitting gas within the clusters from their stars and planets. The
majority of the baryonic matter in the system was now present in the gas, which enabled
the team to directly compare the Bullet cluster’s baryonic distribution with the location of
its gravitational potential. They found that the location of gravitational potential of the
system did not correspond with the location of its baryonic mass.
5.3 Large structure formation
Measurements of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) has been continuously carried
out since its discovery in the 1960’s by Penzias and Wilson. With increasing quality of
data provided by COBE, WMAP, and Planck, the emerging image resulting from the first
free light in the history of the universe has become increasingly clearer. From careful
analysis of the data, cosmologists have seen small temperature fluctuations associated with
fluctuations in matter-density. Lower temperatures corresponds to higher densities, and
higher temperatures to lower densities. The density fluctuations themselves are a result of
random quantum fluctuations which were amplified by the gravitational effects of baryonic
matter and dark matter. Gravity pulled all matter inward, and radiation pressure due to
the photons pushed baryonic matter outward, causing the fluctuations to oscillate. Since
dark matter does not interact electromagnetically, it could exert gravitational influence
without being affected by the radiation pressure. At the time of recombination, when free
electrons coupled with protons to form neutral hydrogen atoms enabling photons to travel
freely, the matter-densities due to these baryonic acoustic oscillations remained in their
current state, ‘frozen’ as it were, providing the initial structure of the matter-distribution
we see today in the form of galaxies and galaxy clusters. Without the gravitational influence
exerted by (cold) dark matter, the formation of the measured fluctuations of matter-density
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cannot be explained, and consequently, present day observations of large structures cannot
be explained.6
5.4 Dark matter and detectionism
How does the evidence that supports the existence of dark matter impact the detectionist
account? No instrumental interaction, neither by direct detection, as in the case of the ex-
perimental approaches taken by DARWIN and CDMS (Cryogenic Dark Matter Search), nor
by indirect detection, as in the case of colliding protons and look for a unique signature of
missing energy, an approach taken by ATLAS at the LHC, has been successful. Detection-
ism appears to give a straight forward answer regarding whether or not we should believe
in the existence of dark matter: no. At this point, it is important to not conflate scientific
endorsement and realist commitment. Obviously, neither Chakravartty nor Azzouni’s ac-
count rules out the dark matter hypothesis as a scientific hypothesis that one can endorse.
The hypothesis is certainly compatible with the observations and data so there is nothing
in their accounts that precludes endorsement. What is at stake is the further claim that
we ought to believe that dark matter really exist given that it works so well as a scientific
hypothesis. In other words, it is realist commitment, not theory endorsement, that is on
the line. With respect to realist commitment, Chakravartty’s view states that dark matter
must be treated as an auxiliary property which we ought to be either agnostic or sceptical
towards. Interestingly, he seems to suggest that auxiliary properties are such that ”[f]urther
investigations may allow us to detect them, thus converting them into detection properties,
or rule them out altogether” ((Chakravartty 2007, 48)).
The present situation with respect to dark matter does not conveniently fit into this
categorisation. Dark matter might only ever interact with gravity (or with other particles
in the so called ”hidden” or ”dark” sector beyond the standard model) which would suggest
that it might never be detectable in Chakravartty’s sense, and must therefore permanently
be regarded as mere fiction. In that case, we will never be realists about dark matter,
no matter how much evidence (of the above kind) that we have for its existence. This
result stands in stark contrast to the level of confidence that cosmologists, astronomers, and
astrophysicists have in the existence of dark matter. More worrying is the fact that the
collected evidence for dark matter can be interpreted as entirely irrelevant for realist belief
according to the detectionist view. Should the evidence for dark matter not be regarded
as evidence for its existence according to the detectionist account? Azzouni’s tracking
requirement even seems to discount the CMB as something that we can believe in given
that we cannot monitor it over time. Recall that monitoring over time was an epistemic
feature of instrumental interaction modelled on observation:
What’s observed can be monitored, either in the sense of detecting what things
observed do over time (watching an insect), or in the sense that time can be taken
to explore different aspects of them (climbing a mountain). (Azzouni 2004, 383)
It is not clear that the CMB can be monitored in the sense of detecting what it does
over time. Firstly, there are issues with respect to what monitoring over time is even
supposed to mean in the context of measuring radiation that was emitted over 13 billion
years ago. We do have three separate measurements of the CMB, performed by COBE,
6What is known as ‘hot dark matter’ is not compatible with the observed large scale structure since its
free streaming length suppresses the growth of small scale structures in the early universe.
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WMAP, and the Planck satellite, which could be argued to constitute monitoring over
time. However, the level of precision in measurement differs so greatly between the three
missions that any differences in the data could not be attributed to changes in the CMB
over time. Additionally, it is unclear what the detectionist could make of the data without
theoretical interpretation. It may simply be the case that a detectionist sees the CMB as
evidence for radiation only. All other conclusions drawn from the data requires theory,
which violates Azzouni’s second condition: that what instruments reveal must be theory-
free. This condition seems to plague other evidential contexts as well. Instrumental access
to galaxies to establish flat rotation curves can only yield data of radiation and radial
velocities, but any explanation of the dynamics of the galaxy involves General Relativity as
a background assumption and an inference to additional matter. The major, or at least most
interesting, part of what the observations reveal is thus theory-dependent. The phenomena
of gravitational lensing is also intrinsically linked to GR. In fact, physics and astronomy
in general posit entities and phenomena that are dependent on both inferences and well-
established theory, but surely this does not mean that we could never have good enough
evidence to believe in their existence, or worse, that there couldn’t possibly be any evidence
for their existence.
A possible rejoinder from Azzouni may invoke a line of indirect causal links. The tracking
requirement stated that ”sensitivity to objects must be due to a physical operation of those
objects (or of things which those objects have affected) on us”. It might be possible, from
Azzouni’s perspective, to argue that dark matter has had a causal effect on the systems we
observe, in which case there is an indirect causal connection between dark matter and our
instruments. However, such a move is internally inconsistent:
[...] to hypothesize a causal connection between theoretical terms and what’s
referred to is to make a metaphysical claim. Causation thus far belongs to
theory - and so if one tells a ’success story’ about one’s theory and then brings in
causal connections that way (as part of our successful theories), or if one invokes
causal connections to theoretical entities as on a par with causal connections to
observable entities, one has failed to address the opponents epistemically; but
their challenges to realism lie in epistemology, not metaphysics. (Azzouni 2004,
390-1)
The claim that we have an indirect causal connection to dark matter via its physical
influence on the behavior of baryonic matter due to its gravitational influence on Azzouni’s
view is to presuppose the connection between the theoretical term and what it refers to.
Moreover, no instrumental interactions with dark matter has been made by instruments
specifically constructed for this purpose. The instruments that have been used to obtain
the data from which dark matter has been inferred are mostly telescopes capable of detecting
different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum and spectrometers (although more recent
developments include gravitational signals and neutrino detectors), neither of which are
directly sensitive to dark matter, so would not be able to track it in the sense required.
6 Explanationism and Cosmology
Prima facie, explanationism is largely unaffected by the two arguments considered here.
With respect to the evidence given in support of the existence of dark matter, many of the
individual evidential situations rely on explanatory reasoning, and the collected evidence
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displays one of the virtues associated with explanationism - unification. A quick reflection
of the evidence is sufficient to substantiate these points. The best explanation for flat
rotation curves is the presence of additional matter influencing the dynamical behavior of
galaxies. The background assumption for this piece of explanatory reasoning is of course
that GR is a correct description of gravity at large scales. In fact, the only other explanation
for the phenomena of flat rotation curves is modified Newtonian dynamics, known as the
abbreviation MOND, which rejects the background assumption that GR correctly describes
gravity in large scale systems. MOND instead replaces F = ma in low acceleration systems
with F = ma2/a0 implying that gravity works differently at different scales. However, in so
far as we think that GR is correct, there is no alternative explanation on offer other than
that the presence of dark matter alters the dynamics of galaxies with flat rotation curves
by influencing spacetime. A stronger argument against MOND is also that it is only an
alternative theory to GR with respect to certain domains. While it is an alternative to
explaining flat rotation curves, it is not an alternative explanation to dark matter in most
other contexts, for example with respect to the Bullet Cluster and large structure formation.
In the Bullet Cluster case, MOND is unable to account for the fact that the gravitational
potential is decoupled from the baryonic mass. However, if only matter influences spacetime,
as GR states, then any distortion of spacetime will be due to the presence of matter, in
which case only the existence of additional non-luminous matter can explain the observed
gravitational potential in the Bullet Cluster.
The explanatory reasoning invoked within each of these individual evidential cases may
serve as indications that the dark matter hypothesis is a viable hypothesis that science
ought to pursue, but is it enough to license a genuine realist commitment? It is one thing
to say that explanatory reasoning can be used for theory-endorsement, it’s quite another
to say that it should guide realist commitment, as the scientific realist claim. The situa-
tion is somewhat perplexing. In many of the evidential contexts considered, dark matter
is the best explanation, which should prompt a realist commitment. It is unreasonable,
however, to suggest that a single evidential context is enough to conclusively confirm the
existence of dark matter. The main reason for believing that dark matter actually exist is
not the explanatory reasoning employed within each evidential context but rather that all
the evidence, taken collectively, is so well explained by the existence of dark matter.7 This,
of course, is the well known idea that unification is an explanatory virtue of hypotheses
which are true. When asked why to believe that dark matter actually exist, cosmologists
and particle physicists invoke precisely the fact that the existence of dark matter not only
explains a specific set of data, but a huge variety of data and phenomena.8 Dark matter
unifies several distinct phenomena that other hypotheses simply cannot. As we saw, even
when properly formulated relativistically, MOND has only been successful in predicting flat
rotation curves for galaxies, but fails to account for the separation of gravitational potential
and baryonic matter in the Bullet cluster, mass/light discrepancies in large galaxy clusters,
and the large scale structure of the universe. It is the fact that dark matter can explain
these distinct phenomena, many of them unknown at the time the dark matter hypothesis
became a serious scientific hypothesis, that make scientists so convinced that dark matter
really exist. In light of this, the epistemology of explanationism, as compared to detection-
ism, coheres better with scientific reasoning and is better equipped to deal with the evidence
in cosmology and astronomy.
7While this is well within the spirit of explanationism, it implies that the epistemic bar for conclusive
confirmation is (and ought to be) higher than for realist commitment, which runs counter to realist intuitions.
8These answers are compounded from conversations with cosmologists and particle physicists.
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7 Conclusion
Philosophers of science has sought to provide an account of when we ought to believe in
entities postulated in scientific theories. Cosmology and astronomy provide a rich context of
scientific theories in which we can test these normative accounts for rational belief. In this
paper, I argued that one such account, detectionism, failed to accurately track the objects
of rational belief. First, it unreasonably entailed that we ought not believe that galaxies
which passes the cosmological event horizon exist since this horizon is a causal boundary.
There is no reason to expect these galaxies to suddenly collapse or vanish simply because
we cannot longer receive information from them, but it is nevertheless what detectionism
implies. Second, it cannot account for the evidence given for dark matter, since this evidence
essentially relies on inference given a background theory. No instrumental interaction with
dark matter has as of yet been established, which in the detectionist framework means that
there is no reason, pace cosmologists, to believe that it exist. To disregard the evidence for
dark matter as evidence simply because no direct causal contact has been established is an
unreasonable epistemology for cosmology and astronomy. A rival account for rational belief,
explanationism, was argued to better account for the evidence and reasoning in this context.
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